The Maize Subsector in South Africa: Emerging Policy Issues by Rubey, Lawrence
AGRICULTURAL
AND INTENSION
WORKING PAPER
----------------- -----------------  ■ -N
The Maize Subsector in South Africa: 
Emerging Policy Issues
by
Lawrence Rubey
Working Paper AEE 7/92
V J
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & EXTENSION 
FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 
P.O. BOX M P 167, MOUNT PLEASANT, HARARE
ZIMBABWE
THE MAIZE SUBSECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
EMERGING POLICY ISSUES
/
by
\ -
Lawrence Rubey
Working Paper AEE 7/92
Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension 
Faculty of Agriculture. .
University of Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box MP 107'
Mount Pleasant ^
Harare
ZIMBABWE October 1992
Lawrence Rubey is a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.
l l ie  views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily express 
those of the Department, University or any other institution.
Working Papers are published with minimal formal review by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Extension.
As in much of Southern and Eastern Africa, the maize marketing system in South 
Africa is largely controlled by a government parastatal, the Maize Board. Although the past 
decade has seen several reforms in South Africa’s single channel maize marketing system, 
market reform has not received the urgent attention that it has brother countries of the 
region. This is despite evidence that, even in normal rainfall years, large numbers of South 
African consumers are "food insecure."1 There is considerable evidence that, despite record 
maize harvests in the late 1980’s, chronic protein-energy malnutrition is widespread among 
rural black schoolchildren, affecting 25 to 40 percent of the population (UNICEF, 1989).
There are several possible reasons for the lack of pressures for marketing reform 
under such circumstances. First, the unique nature of South Africa’s political environment 
has limited involvement by international donor institutions. This has meant that the impetus 
for reform can only come from within, not from "outside" as has usually been the case in the 
region. Second, there is a widespread perception within South Africa that the Maize Board 
has been a relatively efficient institution. Proponents of the single-channel marketing system 
point to the considerable degree of price and <producer_income stability that has prevailed 
and contrast the current situation to the "free market" price disasters' of the 1930’s that 
precipitated the creation of the Maize Board.
This paper, while accepting these two explanations, suggests that there is a third 
interpretation of the apparent lack of a true'reform  impulse: South Africa’s maize
marketing system, like many such systems in Africa, was designed to meet the needs of a 
particular group of market participants, namely white commercial farmers and large-scale 
maize millers. Since to date, the marketing systeni has met these needs, there is little 
impetus for change, especially given the rigidities of the current political system. In this 
view, significant reforms of the maize marketing system will only occur when representatives 
of the disenfranchised majority obtain a degree of control over the conduct of agricultural 
policy in South Africa. Given the rapid pace of political reform and the apparent 
commitment to broader participation in government policy making, within-the next few 
years there will likely be increased focus on options for reform of the maize marketing 
system. In particular, there may be substantial scope for addressing the "food insecurity 
paradox" and raising rural incomes through select reforms of the maize marketing system.
By drawing on the available literature, interviews with knowledgeable market 
participants and South African academics, and the experience of other Southern African 
nations, this paper attempts to identify the emerging policy issues in the maize sub-sector 
and outline an agenda for future research.
1 As Rukuni and Eicher (1985) have pointed out, food security 
has two key components:.national food availability and food access 
by individuals. Food access failures permit the coexistence of 
large national grain surpluses and malnutrition.
I. Maize production and price policy in South Africa
In South Africa, the total area planted to maize has steadily declined over the last 
decade. For example, area planted declined from 4.3 trillion hectares in 1980/81 to 3.0 
million hectares in 1991/92 (Maize Board, 1992). Falling real producer prices are generally 
blamed for this erosion in area planted. Over the past five years, inflation has been running 
at 15-20 percent, while the Maize Board buying price has only increased by about 10 percent 
per year (Maize Board, 1992). Due to producer price increases and concerted government 
efforts for the 1992/93 growing season, maize plantings did increase to 3.44 million hectares, 
with 1.87 million hectares devoted to white maize and 1.57 million hectares devoted to 
yellow maize. However, the severe drought in the Southern African region severely reduced 
yields and production fell to 3.5 million metric tonnes, down from 7.3 million tonnes in 
1990/91 and 11.5 million tonnes in 1989/90 (Financial Gazette, 1992). As a consequence, 
South Africa plans to import over 4.5 million tonnes of maize during the 1992/93 marketing 
year. In a normal year, the domestic demand is about 7.3 million metric tonnes.
Maize production is divided fairly evenly between while and yellow maize. During 
1990/91, .4.36 million metric tonnes of white incize were produced compared to 3.98 million 
metric tonnes of yellow maize. For the last two marketing seasons, there has been no 
difference in the producer prices for white maize and yellow maize. Even in the 1989/90 
marketing year, the white maize producer price was only 3 percent higher than the yellow 
maize producer price. Yellow maize yields are often higher than those of .white maize, 
although based on the experience of growers in South Africa and the existing hybrids now 
in use the maximum yield differential between yellow and.while is about 10 percent (Elliott, 
1992). . , .
The maintenance of price stability has been the major challenge of the Maize Board. 
As in much of the region, South African farming areas are drought-prone. Without crucial 
rainfall in January and February, when lasselling takes place, production can be severely 
affected. Maize price setting, as carried out by the Maize Board, is a complex task. In 
essence, the Maize Board has a graduated pricing system. Each August, a price scenario 
is announced for the coming planting season that links a given national crop to a particular 
producer price. For example, in 1991/92, a 6.5 million metric tonne crop was linked to a 
producer price of R387 per tonne, while a bumper harvest of 11 million metric tonnes would 
have meant a producer price of only R287 per tonne. The price and crop scenarios 
developed by the Maize Board are based on variables such as expected demand, projected 
interest and inflation rates, export price trends and the Board’s budget situation. By 
October or November, farmers must decide how much to plant, based on the price and crop 
scenarios and predictions about the weather. In March of the following year, once the size 
of the crop is known, Maize Board buying and selling prices for the marketing year are 
announced.
Producer prices are set by the Maize Board and are pan-territorial and pan-seasonal. 
The Maize Board also utilizing a computer-based "least cost" model that is used to manage 
the complex task of distributing and allocating Maize Board stocks in a manner that 
minimizes the Board’s transport and storage costs. Maize prices for the 1990/9Tmarketing 
year are outlined in Table 1.
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Table 1: Maize Prices (Rand per metric tonneX
y V  ’ . ‘ ' • ’ 1 '
1990/91 marketing year Vh
Yellow v
* v  y -  i '  ' - ■ * / "
Maize Board producer price (including 
'supplementary payments)'-'-
1 - -  302,67 ;  302.67 .
Maize Board selling price (best grades) ,  393.00 :
. - ^  \ ____
360.00 r ^
For much of the 1980s, South Africa was one of the few countries in the region to 
post frequent maize surpluses:'However, the export possibilities o fthe  Maize Board are 
limited since South Africa has not been able to profitably export outside the Southern 
African^ region given recent domestic and international prices. I-Iigh transport costs to 
overseas markets and large producer subsidies-paid by the EEC and-U.S! limit me ability 
o£So.ulh Africa to export maize as stockfeeds.^Regional markets in white maize ate limited.
- The occurrence of bumper harvests generally tend to coincide iii the region;1 When South 
African maize producers experience good harvests^ so do many other producers in 
neighbouring countries. However, in 1991V South Africa was able to export a significant 
amount of white maize to neighboring African nations;at a profit. /
II. Maize marketing . ~  ^ i ; ?
As in many Southern African countries, South Africa is divided into geographical 
. entities that govern maize movements and inaize sales by producers. South Africa is divided , 
into Area "A," A;ea "B,".and the "exempted area." Area "A” comprises the Transvaal 
province, the Orange Free State province, arid selected districts in the Cape Prqvincearid * 
Natal province. The bulk of the nation’s marketed maize is produced in this area; 
Producers in Area "A" must sell their maize to the Maize Board , its agents, registered 
'' miller traders dr end-users of yellow maize. "Miller traders" are commercial millers that are 
y- registered with the Maize Board to buy maize directly from producers. Although end-users 
of.yellow maize, such as stockfceders, can buy directly from producers, they must pay a 
prescribed levy to the Maize Board (Maize Board, 1991).
Area "B" comprises the remaining districts in the Cape Province and the province of 
Natal. Producers in Area "B" must sell their maize to either the Maize board, registered 
maize, traders, and registered miller traders. Registered maize traders buy. niaize for their 
„ own account at prices that lhaynot be less than the prices fixed for Area "A." Traders are 
required to provide monthly rcturns of their transactions to the Maize Board and pay a levy 
of purchases of producer maize (Maize Board, 1991). -  c .
, , The rest of South, Africa and the so:called "homelmids" are Cxempted areas in which 
producers can sell to any person within the area at any price. However, since inbst of the 
marketed inaize is produced hi, controlled areas (i.e. -Area "A" arid A rea "B"), the Maize ; 
Board has virtually complete control over the disposal of all maize marketed in the country.
4 .-
j (
III. Maize milling
Maize milling in South Africa is dominated by a commercial milling industry that 
comprises over 60 firms. The sheer number of milling firms leads many to believe that 
there is a significant degree of competition in the milling industry (Elliott, 1992). Yet the 
two largest firms, Tiger Milling and Premier Milling, each have approximately 20 percent 
bf the maize meal market. There is a common perception that the milling industry is 
operating far below capacity. Most millers operate only one shift. It has been estimated 
that the nation’s total milling capacity is only about 25 percent utilized (Financial Mail, 
1991). , . '
The extraction rates, minimum and maximum oil and fiber content, and particle size 
of maize meal must conform to industry standards. Four types bf maize meal are produced 
by millers:
1) "super", (or "fine"), a highly refined, degermed product with a 62.5 p e rc e n t
extraction rate; ; n
2) "special sifted,"^ a refined  p roduct with an ex trac tion  ra te  
of 78.7 percent. Special sifted comprises over half of the maize meal market
and is sometimes enriched with proteins and vitamins;
3) "sifted," a less refined, product, with an 88.7 percent extraction rate; and
4) "unsifted" or "straight-run," an.unrefined meal with an'extraction rate of over 98 
percent.
; - ' ' .
A range of other maize grain products are also manufactured for specialized uses_ 
including: samp, halved or quartered maize kernels with all the bran and germ removed; 
maize rice, rice-like particles of 2 mm to 3 rnm produced from the hard endosperm of the 
maize kernel; maize grits, a product with a very low oil content used primarily in the 
manufacture of traditional beer; and maize flour, primarily used by the baking industry.
Interestingly, despite the diversity of maize meal products on the market, there is not 
a great deal of price differentiation between meal of different processing types. In April 
1992, the maximum differential between the cheapest type of meal (straight-run) and the 
most expensive "super" was only 30 percent.
Although the maximum prices at which maize could be sold by millers were'fixed by 
the Maize Board until 1971, there are currently no restrictions on retail maize meal prices. 
Price controls were lifted because the Maize board was convinced that the degree of ■ 
competition existing, in the industry due to excess capacity would prevent large price 
increases. The Maize Board conducts regular surveys of the ex-mill and retail maize meal 
prices in order to determine when consumers are "exploited." 'Apparently no evidence of 
such activity has been found to date (Maize Board, 1991).
However, a comparison of the average milling and, retailing margin in South Africa 
with government-set milling and retailing margin in Zimbabwe reveals an interesting 
paradox. In Zimbabwe, the milling Industry is quite concentrated. ' There are four 
commercial maize millers,; and the largest firm has over 65 percent of the national market. 
In South Africa, there are many more milling firms and, one would expect, a much more 
competitive milling and retailing structure. However, the total milling and retailing margin 
in South Africa is over twice the margin in Zimbabwe (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Comparison of White Maize Marketing and Milling Margins . in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, in Metric Tonnes
(converted to U.S. dollars)2 \
April 1992
South Africa Zimbabwe
A. Parastatal producer price . USS 115 : US$ 110
/
13. Parastatal selling price US$166 US$138
C. Ex-milL price, with no govt subsidy US$342 US$ 210
D. Retail price for 80% extraction rate 
meal,-.with no govt subsidy US$370 US$ 233.
E. Retail price for 80% extraction rate 
meal, including govt subsidy US$ 155 '
F. Maize millers margin (D minus 13) US$ 176 US$ 72
For Zimbabwe,. the government-set maximum ex-mill and retail "roller meal" prices 
were used in the calculation in Table 2. Roller meal in Zimbabwe lias an approximate 
extraction rate of 82-85 percent. For South Africa, where there are no maximum retail 
prices for maize meal, the Premier Milling ex-mill price of "special sifted" maize meal was 
used. The retail price of "special sifted" was obtained by averaging the observed retail price 
in three large chain supermarkets in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Retail prices in rural 
outlets in South Africa would undoubtedly be even higher. ' '  .
There are several possible explanations for this apparent paradox in marketing 
margins. One. or two of the largest millers may act as "price leaders" with the smaller 
millers following this price leadership. However, it is not clear what mechanisms would 
prevent price discounts by smaller, millers to gain a greater-market share, particularly if 
there is under-utilized capacity. Price leadership or collusion at the retail level does riot 
appear plausible given the number,of large retail chains and smaller grocery shops. Another 
possible explanation is that production costs are higher in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. 
Maize millers in South Africa tend to have newer equipment arid face higher labour costs. 
Transport arid energy costs may also be higher. Clearly, this paradox needs further 
investigation as it. is difficult to make inferences about the impact of market structure on
2 Assuming 1US$=2.80 Rand and 1US$=5.0 ZIM$. Given that the 
Zimbabwe dollar is likely to be overvalued by 20 to 40 percent, 
this calculation may overstate the Zimbabwean m a i z e . price 
s t r u c t u r e a l t h o u g h  comparisons of the relative magnitude of 
margins is still valid.
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product pricing based on a rapid appraisal and a limited number of observations.
IV. Maize consumption
Maize is the staple food of the bulk of the population in South Africa. It is 
consumed primarily as a thin breakfast porridge and a thick stiff porridge with the evening 
meal. According to data from the Maize, Board that categorizes maize consumption by 
racial groupings, black consumers account for 94 percent of the maize meal consumed 
(Maize Board, 1992). For rural consumers in this’group, maize products account for 53 
percent of all carbohydrates, while maize products account for 40. percent of all 
carbohydrates consumed by urban consumers in. this grouping (Elliott, 1991).
Maize consumption is primarily a rural phenomenon as over 70 percent of white 
maize is sold in rural areas. Per capita cohsdmjjtion of maize products averages 78 kg in 
rural areas and 48 kg in urban areas (Elliott, 1991). In 1990, over 50 percent of black South 
Africans were residents in rural areas. As in much of Southern Africa, the conventional 
wisdom is that consumers, particularly those in urban areas, prefer the more refined maize 
meal products. ; r
The total domestic market is about 7.3.million tonnes, witlr Maize Board intake 
approximately 6.3 million tonnes in a typical yean About 1 million tonnes are retained each 
yearby producers. - . "
Considerable work has been done by South African academics on price and income 
elasticities for white maize. Cadiz(1984) and Van Zyl (1986), both using country-wide 
data, found that white maize meal had a negative income elasticity of demand and therefore 
was. an "inferior" good. Estimation of price elasticities revealed that demand was somewhat 
price insensitive: a 10 percent increase in price would only reduce quantity demanded by 1.5 
to 3,3 percent. : -
These earlier results have been Called into question by recent work by. Elliott (1991). 
By using consumption data that only included black consumers, he found that white maize 
meal was a "normal" good in that it had a positive income elasticity of demand in both rural 
and urban areas. Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for maize meal were also much 
higher than in .previous studies. Elliott (1992) has asserted that competition from other 
grains, primarily bread and rice, have made consumers, particularly those in urban areas, 
much .more sensitive to price changes. A summary of recent estimates of price and income 
elasticities is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Estimates of White Maize Meal Price and Income 
Elasticities from Previous Studies
-  ' •> ^ Cadiz Van Zyl Elliott
(1984) (1986) (1991)
Price elasticity for human -  -0.33 -0.15 -0.70. (urban)
consumption
'
Income elasticity for human -0.38 ... -0.30 0.06 (urban)/
v .consumption. . 0.20 (rural)
In the last five years, marketing specialists at the Maize Board have been concerned 
about stagnant demand for maize products. In recent years, wheat bread and rice have, 
garnered a greater share of the cereals market at the expense of maize, particularly in urban 
areas. The convenience of bread and rice as urban "fast foods" is >videly thought to be 
, responsible for this trend. The Maize Board fears a fall in future maize demand as a larger 
percentage of the black South African population migrates to urban areas. As a result, the 
Maize Board recently implemented a nationwide advertising campaign. The theme of the 
marketing campaign, "The Maize Generation," is an effort to promote maize consumption 
among younger, urban consumers. ^
V. Emerging policy issues in the South African maize subsector
As South Africa undergoes the process of political transformation, there will likely 
be increased pressures to address the coexistence of food insecurity and large national grain 
stocks. In such an environment, the structure and performance of the maize marketing 
system v/ill undoubtedly become an isSue of major importance. Additional questions arise, 
including: In what sense can the experiences of other nations in the region inform the 
v process of grain marketing reform in South Africa? What can be expected to be the 
emerging policy issues in the maize subsector? Given, the size of the South African market, 
how will changes in grain production and marketing policy affect -its SADCC neighbors? - 
This section examines several emerging policy issues in the South African maize 
subsector. An attempt is made to draw on the experiences of other nations in the region 
as well as identify areas in which approaches taken in South Africa might contribute, to on­
going reforms elsewhere.
The Demand for Yellow Maize and Maize Board Blending
One of the more interesting developments in South African maize .policy lias been 
the increased reliance on blending yellow and white maize, A blend of 70 percent yellow 
maize and 30 percent white maize was mandated for the first time during the 1986/87 
marketing year due to drought. Given the thin market for white maize, domestic shortfalls 
must be met with imported yellow maize. In 1986/87 the Maize Board had limited white 
maize stocks and directed that all millers produce a blended product with set proportions. 
Shortfalls in white maize production also necessitated blending during both the 1990/91 and 
1991/92 marketing years. However, during this period, the proportion of yellow maize was 
much lower, about 15 percent yellow to 85 percent white. Finally, due to the severe drought 
and massive importation of yellow maize, the Maize Board anticipates blending during the 
.1992/93 marketing year for as long as white maize stocks permit. ; '
There is considerable consumer resistance to blended maize products. The objections 
to yellow maize blends include: 1) yellow maize is for animal feed not human, consumption; 
2) yellow maize causes upset stomachs and diarrhea; 3) colour and appearance are an 
extremely important element of "taste" as it is often said that "you eat with your eyes"; 4) 
yellow maize does not keep as well after it is cooked and becomes quite bitter in taste after 
sitting for a while. In essence, the marketing of blended maize products in South Africa has 
become a political issue. Blending is viewed by many as emblematic of a government that
has little concern for the preferences of the black majority.
Due to the unique political circumstances of South Africa, the largely-white 
controlled Maize Board has gone to great lengths to convince consumers of maize that the 
introduction of blended'maize products was a necessary step in the face of maize shortfalls. 
The Mrize Board has undertaken a public relations campaign to convince consumers that, 
at least nutritionally, there is virtually no difference between yellow and white maize. In fact, 
yellow maize does have greater amounts of carotene. Advice on improved cooking methods 
for blended maize products has also been disseminated.
The actual "blending threshold" of yellow maize is unclear. Apparently consumer 
tests have revealed that consumers can (visually) detect relatively small amounts of yellow 
maize in a predominantly white maize product (Elliott, 19-92). The Maize Board lias not 
attempted blindfolded taste tests to date. An informal appraisal in Zimbabwe suggests that 
a blend of up to 30 percent yellow and 70 percent white still retains many of the 
characteristics of white maize, but with greater proportions of yellow maize, the distinction 
between a blended product and yellow maize quickly becomes indistinguishable.
. Clearly, there arc advantages to the marketing of blended maize products, if the 
political ramifications of promoting' blended products are addressed. The potential for 
marketing blended products as a lower cost option to white maize might be an option for 
other, nations in Southern Africa with a less charged political environment. Given the 
significant levels of malnutrition that persist,in the region, there may be opportunities to 
target low-income consumers by subsidizing blended maize products in normal rainfall years. 
The subsidy could be administered at the milling stage and only apply to 2.5 kg bags in 
order to reduce leakage to the stockfeed industry. A market outlet for yellow maize could 
provide Southern African nations with added flexibility in maize policy decisions.
Another interesting feature of the South African maize meal market has been post­
processing enrichment.. In Southern and Eastern Africa, the convehtipnarwisdom is that 
consumers prefer the more refined types of maize, meal. Yet the nutritional value of the 
^more refined meals cambe considerably less than that of the "traditional" unrefined meals. 
In South Africa, "special sifted" maize meal, comprising over half of the market, is often 
enriched with protein and vitamins to replace losses during the milling-process. However, 
there also have been pockets of resistance to enrichment qf maize meal. III.the politically 
charged atmosphere of South Africa, rumours have arisen that the enrichment of maize 
meal is a government attempt to reduce fertility. It is not clear why enrichment has not 
received wider acceptance in the rest of the region.
The Future Role of the Maize Board , i ,
In 1989, South Africa’s Minister of Agriculture appointed a Committee of Enquiry 
to examine maize marketing arrangements. Declining real producer prices and increased 
pressure for government contributions to the Maize Board’s stabilization fund had convinced. 
many that there were "problems" in the, maize industry (Groenewald, 1989). In normal 
years, maize production exceeds domestic demand, but since world market prices have been 
considerably above local producer prices, the Maize Board is often forced to export at a 
loss. Since stockfeeders are very sensitive to changes in the; relative prices of grains, 
increasing the Maize Board.selling prices to compensate for export losses tends to result in
sharp drops in demand for maize from the stockfeed industry. Alternatively, the option 6f 
lowering producer prices to export parity tends to encounter strong opposition from fanners’ 
groups that cite rapidly increasing input costs.
The Committee of Enquiry concluded that the advantages of a single-channel 
marketing system overshadowed the disadvantages and recommended that the Maize Board 
and its appointed agents remain as sole buyer and sellers. In a review of the report of th e . 
Committee of Enquiry, Groenewald (1989) states that the report did little to address future 
maiize marketing needs and represented a -missed opportunity. Thus, to date, the main 
policy thrust has been to increase the-flexibility of the Maize Board in the management of 
its maize trading account.
Yet given the on-going political reorientation of South Africa, it is not inconceivable 
that the Maize Board.will soon face, a new mandate. With the. advent of majority rule irl . 
.Zimbabwean 1980, the new government embarked on a major effort to redress some of the 
inequities of the grain marketing systeni. The number of parastatal depots rose from 35 to,
74, with most of the new depots located near communal farm areas. In 1988/89, a good 
rainfall year, Zimbabwe’s Grain Marketing Board also operated 53 temporary collection 
points from which grain was purchased. Between 1979 and 1985, smallholder maize 
production more than tripled (Rolnbach, 1989). Communal farmers were responsible for. 
over, half of all maize production and over a third of Grain Marketing Board intake. 
Rohrbach (1989) attributes the growth in smallholder production to a complementary.set 
of changes in agricultural policies, institutions, and technologies. The changes include: 1) ..
a dramatic rise in producer prices in the early 1980’s; 2) commitment to strong research and 
- extension support; and 3) improved access to credit, input markets, and product markets.
However, despite these apparent advances, the lesson learned in Zimbabwe has been 
that increased provision of marketing services to smallholders is, at best, a mixed blessing 
(Jayne and Chisvo, 1991). Since the majority of smallholders in semi-arid farming areas in _
\  Southern Africa are net buyers of grain, even with an infusion of institutional and technical 
./ support, investment in an extractive grain.marketing infrastructure may dp little for the 
majority of smallholders. A careful evaluation of the effects of pursuing the Zimbabweafl 
model of parastatal. development on the food security status of South African smallholders 
ia  marginal areas is required. It may-well be that efforts-to ameliorate food insecurity in 
smallholder areas rests on the development of a vibrant private grain trading network that 
can coordinate the transport of grain from commercial farming areas, the processing of grain ; 
a t local hammer mills, and the distribution of packaged "straight-run" meal to retail outlets.
Potential Impacts of Maize Market Liberalization on Food Security
In Zimbabwe, recent research has found that a complex set of grain marketing 
regulations and movement restrictions have had an adverse effect of the food security status 
■ of rural households (Jayne and Chisvo, 1991). There is also evidence that this set of 
marketing restrictions and policy-induced constraints has restricted the'ability of small-scale 
hammer millers to provide urban consumers with a less costly and less refined maize meal 
product, thereby preserving the market, share of a concentrated industrial milling sector 
(Jayne and Rubcy, 1992). Evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that the poor are the. main
10
consumers of maize .meal'from, small hammer mills. ~
Many of the same peculiarities that led researchers in Zimbabwe to partially attribute 
rural and urban household food insecurity to a-restrictive maizdTnarketing system exist in 
South Africa. The "food insecurity paradox" of the 1980’s in Zimbabwe mirrors the South 
African experience very closely. The stark duality of the agricultural sector in South Africa 
dwarfs even that of Zimbabwe. Maize production and marketing is dominated by large 
commercial farmers in the favorable agro-ecological zones. The vast majority of 
smallholders live on marginal lands and are dependent to some extent on non-agricultural 
earnings and remittances.  ^ • . . . • . i ■
There is anecdotal evidence of a strong seasonal pattern to commercial sales of 
maize-meal. Because of own-production in smallholder areas, sales of commercial maize 
meal drop off at harvest. Maize produced by smallholders is either ground by hand or 
milled at a local hammer mill. As the marketing year progresses and rural smallholders run 
out of grain, sales gradually starMo pick up. Commercial millers in South Africa speak of 
this slack period after harvest as the time when "the market has; not started to run." 
Furthermore, Maize Board officials have acknowledged th a t the Board does not make 
provisions for "ultra-small buyers." . _
^  Although a firm conclusion awaits further research and solid empirical evidence, it - 
is hypothesized that the prohibitions against a private grain trade and the . apparent 
Unidirectional flow.of grain from producing areas into the Maize Board and the commercial 
milling system have had negative impacts on rural households in marginal farming areas that 
are net buyers of grain. The large milling margins in the commercial milling sector would 
> indicate that a locally iriilled "straight-run" meal could be made available at a considerably 
lower price than commercially-produced maize meal.
(
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